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 American Philosophical Quarterly
 Volume ii, Number 4, October 1974
 I. REGENT WORK ON 17TH CENTURY
 CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
 EDWIN CURLEY
 HPHE decade just past has been a fruitful and
 -* exciting one for those interested in the history
 of continental philosophy in the 17th century. Not
 only has there been a great deal of work published
 on that period, but an encouragingly high pro?
 portion of it has proven to be well worth publish?
 ing. We have good, new translations and critical
 editions of many works of both major and minor
 figures, new bibliographical guides to the litera?
 ture on them, and a growing body of instructive
 secondary works. The history of philosophy seems
 now to be attracting, with much greater frequency
 than was the case, say, 20 years ago, writers who
 combine a sympathetic and scholarly approach to
 the philosophers they study with genuine philo?
 sophical competence of their own in sorting out the
 issues raised and saying something about those
 issues. While there is still much that needs to be
 done to improve our understanding of the period,
 the record of the past decade has been a hopeful
 one.
 Under these circumstances, one can hardly ex?
 pect to do more than give a brief indication of some
 of the highlights of recent work. I shall concentrate
 on studies of the philosophers whom I regard as
 major and central?Descartes, Spinoza, Male
 branche, and Leibniz?leaving it primarily to the
 bibliography to provide some guide to the often
 very interesting work on philosophers who must be
 regarded as comparatively minor or peripheral (e.g.
 Bayle, Gassendi, Galileo, and Pascal), and to such
 aids to scholarship as translations, editions, and
 bibliographies. Aids to scholarship which are of
 special interest will be starred items in the bib?
 liography.
 I. Descartes
 Recent English work on Descartes has con?
 centrated on certain classical cruxes of interpreta?
 tion?the cogito, the circle, and the ontological
 argument?and has done a great deal to clarify the
 problems these topics involve. A good example is
 provided by Hintikka's article on the cogito (6).
 It is oubtful whether many of the positive sug?
 gestions Hintikka makes will survive critical
 scrutiny, but there is no doubt that the discussion
 he provoked has been extremely helpful.
 The puzzle with which Hintikka is primarily
 concerned is this : Does Descartes regard his knowl?
 edge of his own existence as intuitive or as based
 on an inference ? Both alternatives can be supported
 textually and both alternatives present philo?
 sophical difficulties for the Cartesian system.
Descartes does say in the Regulae (Rule 3) that
 everyone sees by an intuition that he exists, that he
 thinks, and many other things. And in the Second
 Replies he seems to say again that his existence is
 known intuitively. But this approach invites em
 harassing questions about the reliability of our
 intuitions and about Descartes' right to assume
 their reliability at the stage in the Meditations when
 he puts the cogito forward. Again, in most of
 D scartes' presentations of the cogito he certainly
 makes it look as though he is inferring existence
 from thinking. Except for the Regulae, which is an
early work, and the Second Meditation, the standard
 formula tends to be "I think, therefore, I exist."
 But how i  this compatible with the apparent status
 of "I exist" as a first principle? And how would
 Descartes justify his reliance on the premisses
 which, prima facie, are involved ?
 Hintikka offers us the notion of "I exist" as
 something like a performative utterance, rather
 than an inference. Contrary to the suggestion of
 his title, he does not regard the alternative he sets
 before us as an exclusive one. We need not choose
 between inference and performance. The cogito is
 both. But Hintikka prefers to emphasize the per
 formatory aspect, partly because he thinks that,
 viewed as an inference, it is not a very good
 argument.
 As an inference, Hintikka contends, the cogito is
 an instance of modus ponens, with a suppressed
 conditional premiss of the form :
 (i) Ba => (3x)(x = a)
 While Hintikka concedes that this conditional is
 235
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 provable in standard systems of predicate logic, he
 thinks that in the sense in which it is true it is of no
 use to Descartes in proving his conclusion. The
 systems of logic in which (i) is provable all tacitly
 assume that the singular terms employed really re?
 fer to some actually existing individual. If we make
 this assumption, then before we can assert the
 categorical premiss of our argument,
 (ii) Ba
 the " I think," we must be in a position to assert the
 conclusion,
 (iii) (3#) {x ? a)
 the "I exist." The argument will be formally valid
 and its premisses will be true, but it will be
 question-begging, since establishing the truth of the
 conclusion will be a necessary condition of estab?
 lishing the truth of the categorical premiss.
 But if we drop the assumption that all singular
 terms designate actually existing individuals, then,
 though we shall be able to determine the truth of
 our categorical premiss without first determining
 the truth of our conclusion, the conditional premiss
 will be false. Ba will be true where Bx is read "x
 thinks" and a designates Hamlet, but {3x){x = a)
 will be false for that interpretation of a and so
 Ba => {3x){x = a) will not be a logically true for?
 mula. Hintikka has other, textual objections to
 reading the cogito as an inference, but he is well
 aware that the textual evidence points both ways.
 This is the difficulty he treats as most serious.
 So he proposes to regard the cogito as a per?
 formance, though this is held to be only the better
 half of Descartes' insight. Descartes should be
 viewed as recognizing the absurdity of performing
 a certain kind of action, denying his own existence.
 The sentence "I don't exist" though formally con?
 sistent, and therefore not logically false, is neverthe?
 less existentially inconsistent, and hence, impossible
 to defend or believe. Its contradictory, "I exist,"
 is therefore self-verifying. This is a sophisticated
 modern version of the view that " I exist" is certain
 on intuitive grounds.
 A sentence, p, is existentially inconsistent for a to
 utter (assertively) if and only "p and a exists" is
 inconsistent (in the ordinary sense). E.g., "Nixon
 does not exist" is existentially inconsistent for
 Nixon to utter. Hintikka speaks of the utterance of a
 sentence by a person for whom the utterance ofthat
 sentence is existentially inconsistent as an exis?
 tentially inconsistent statement.
 Normally an existentially inconsistent statement
 will be pointless, since it will defeat one of the
 Standard purposes of uttering a declarative sen?
 tence, that of making the hearer believe what one
 says. If the hearer identifies the man speaking as
 the man the sentence is about, he will recognize
 that the statement is false. But the hearer might
 understand the sentence without identifying the
 speaker as the man the sentence is about. Hence,
 existentially inconsistent statements are not in?
 evitably self-defeating.
 "I do not exist" is a special case in two respects.
 First, since the function of e I ' is simply to refer to
 the speaker, the sentence is existentially inconsistent
 for anyone to utter. Secondly, here it is a necessary
 condition of the hearer's understanding the sen?
 tence that he identify the speaker as the man
 spoken about. Unless he does make the identifi?
 cation, he does not understand the use of CI'. So
 "I don't exist" is inevitably self-defeating for any?
 one to utter assertively, and therefore, absurd in a
 very special way. Conversely, "I exist" is self
 verifying.
 One problem for any interpretation along these
 lines is to explain why Descartes so often gives the
 illusion that he is inferring his existence from his
 thought, when really he is recognizing the self
 evidence of his existence. What are the words
 cogito and ergo doing in the cogito ergo sum ?
 Hintikka's claim is that the "I think" expresses
 the performatory character of Descartes' insight.
 It is from an act of thought that Descartes comes to
 recognize the indubitability of his own existence,
 viz., the act of trying to think the contrary.
 Descartes cannot think that he does not exist, in the
 sense of making himself believe it. The attempt to
 make himself believe that he does not exist is
 necessarily self-defeating. So the relation of cogito to
 sum is more a causal one than a relation of in?
 ference. A certain (attempted) thought act neces?
 sarily produces a conviction of existence. It would
 be more accurate for Descartes to say "By thinking
 I perceive my existence." But the thinking part is
 quite essential. Not just any action will do. It must
 be an act of thought, specifically, an act of trying
 to persuade myself that I do not exist.
 Hintikka's interpretation has a certain philo?
 sophic interest in its own right, whatever its value
 may be for the understanding of Descartes. His
 remarks about the logical peculiarities of the sen?
 tence "I do not exist" strike me as correct and
 important. But his interpretation encounters some
 difficulties as an account of Descartes' thought,
 difficulties which I think have been brought out
 best in an article by Harry Frankfurt (5).
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 His criticism centers on Hintikka's explanation of
 the role of thinking in the cogito. There are two
 main points. First, Hintikka's interpretation re?
 quires that the thought act which results in my
 perception of my own existence have a very specific
 content : what I am trying to think is that I do not
 exist. In failing to believe this, I realize that I do
 exist. But the thought acts with which Descartes is
 willing to connect his own existence are quite
 varied in their content?my existence follows from
 my being persuaded that there are no bodies, no
 heaven, no earth, etc. ; it follows from my judging
 that the wax exists or from my judging that I do
 exist. Secondly, Hintikka's interpretation requires
 that the thought act be of a very special kind. It
 will not do for the performative interpretation if I
 simply contemplate the possibility of my not exist?
 ing, for that is something I certainly can do. The
 thought act must be an attempt to think my present
 non-existence with assent. But for Descartes it is
 clear that a wide variety of thought acts will do. I
 can infer my existence from my doubting or even
 from the fact that I entertain the proposition "I
 exist."
 Hintikka, of course, can not be decisively refuted
 by such evidence. He was familiar with the relevant
 passages when he first wrote, and his insistence that
 Descartes did not keep consistently to any one
 interpretation renders him virtually immune to
 textual rebuttal. What is needed is a satisfactory
 answer to his philosophic objections to treating the
 cogito as an inference.1 And I think the work of
 Popkin (34) and Frankfurt (4) does point the way
 to such an answer. What follows is an attempt to
 outline a possible response. It is not so much an
 account of what has been said, as a variation on
 certain prominent themes of recent studies.
 Hintikka's central objection seems to be this: If
 we make certain assumptions about the singular
 terms we use, then "I think" is logically sufficient
 for "I exist." But then knowing that "I exist" will
 be a necessary condition of knowing that I think.
 And so the inference will not be probative.
 One might be tempted to reply that if so, then
 any valid deductive argument would have to fail as
 a proof. For if it is valid, the truth of the premisses
 will be sufficient for the truth of the conclusion and
 the way will be open for someone to argue that
 knowing the truth of the conclusion is a necessary
 condition of knowing the truth of the premiss.
 Hintikka's objection to the cogito begins now to
 resemble Mill's objection to the syllogism, and to be
 applicable to deductive reasoning generally. Many
 might think this a sufficient response. It is patently
 false that all deductive reasoning involves a
 petitio.
 But would Descartes feel that he could take it for
 granted that some deductive reasoning is probative ?
 Criticisms of the syllogism like Mill's had been
 made by the sceptics as early as Sextus Empiricus,
 repeated by Renaissance writers like Sanchez (see
 Popkin (34)) and apparently accepted by Descartes
 himself in the Regulae. Would he not have thought
 that the accusation of question-begging raised a
 serious problem?
 The correct reply to Hintikka's objection, I sug?
 gest, is that while the cogito is an inference, it is not
 a demonstration or proof in any classical sense. It is
 not essential to an inference that the premisses of
 the inference be known to be true, though this is
 essential to a proof. It is because we think the
 cogito must be a proof, if it is an inference at all, that
 we think its premiss must be known (cf. Kenny (8)).
 But this only obscures the point of Descartes'
 enterprise.
 As Popkin and Frankfurt have stressed, Descartes
 is fundamentally concerned with overcoming the
 difficulties raised against "dogmatic" philosophers
 by the sceptics. I take it that he is particularly
 anxious about the objections they made against the
 notion of proof. Proof cannot go on to infinity. The
 process of establishing one proposition by citing
 others which entail it and are known to be true
 must come to an end somewhere in propositions
 which are not themselves proven. The problem is to
 find a premiss or set of premisses which can serve
 as first principles without reasonably incurring the
 accusation that, since they are not proven, they are
 merely arbitrary assumptions.
 Descartes does not want to rely on the contention
 that his first principles are self-evident. He knows
 this would be dismissed by the sceptic as a bare
 assertion, a matter of subjective conviction, liable
 to great variation from one person to another. So
 he adopts a negative procedure for getting his first
 principles. As Frankfurt puts it, "he establishes
 truths by removing the grounds for doubting them
 rather than by proving their truth in a direct way"
 ((4), p. 174).
 Cartesian drmht must alwavs he rp.asnnahfo dnnht.
 1 The apparent textual counter-evidence is very well treated in Bernard Williams' article in the Doney collection (3). Set
 also Weinberg (il), Kenny (8) and Rod (10).
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 but the requirements for reasonable doubt are de?
 liberately very weak. The ground offered for doubt?
 ing need not have anything positive to be said for it,
 though in general there should be no intellectually
 compelling argument against it. Descartes' pro?
 cedure for " establishing" first principles is to accept
 all and only those propositions which he can con?
 ceive no reasonable ground for doubting. He will
 systematically apply to his former beliefs the most
 powerful grounds of doubt he can find. What sur?
 vives the procedure cannot be said to be accepted
 arbitrarily. To believe only what you have no
 reasonable ground for doubting?in this weak sense
 of "reasonable"?is to have very high standards of
 rationality. But to accept what survives systematic
 doubt is not to put something forward as the con?
 clusion of a proof.
 That I exist is, as Descartes insists, a first prin?
 ciple. But it is an acceptable principle because it
 survives systematic doubt. Any ground for doubting
 my existence which purports to be reasonable will
 have to explain my erroneous belief in my existence.
 So it will have to involve the supposition that I
 think. And thought entails a thinker. So "I exist"
 is inferred from "I think," but "I think" is not a
 premiss of a proof, not a proposition which
 Descartes must take any responsibility for defending
 as known to be true. It is an essential element in
 any hypothesis which I might entertain, or an
 opponent might suggest, to throw reasonable doubt
 on my existence.
 The emphasis placed here on the requirement that
 doubt be reasonable is also important in Frank?
 furt's proposed solution to the problem of the
 circle (4). Suppose we put this difficulty as Arnauld
 put it?"we are certain that the things we conceive
 clearly and distinctly are true because God exists ...
 we can only be certain that God exists because we
 conceive that very clearly and distinctly, so before
 we can be certain that God exists, we must be
 certain that whatever we conceive clearly and dis?
 tinctly is true."
 Frankfurt's reply is roughly as follows. If being
 certain is equivalent to being unable to doubt, then
 it is just a mistake to suppose that we can be certain
 of God's existence only if we already are certain
 that whatever we conceive clearly and distinctly is
 true. So long as we are attending to the proof of
 God's existence and conceiving it clearly and
 distinctly, we shall be in a state where non possumus
 non credere. All present clear and distinct ideas com?
 pel assent and are, in that sense, indubitable.
 But indubitability, in that sense, is not equivalent
 to knowing. It is a psychological state of complete
 conviction, from which we may fall when we are
 no longer attending to the arguments which in?
 duced it. "Indubitable" can, however, be given a
 normative sense. Though it may be possible to
 doubt propositions which were once, but are not
 now, conceived clearly and distinctly, it may not
 be possible to doubt them reasonably. In the First
 Meditation the supposition that there may be a de?
 ceiving God constitutes a reasonable ground for
 doubting the truth of the things that seem most
 evident to us. But by the end of the Fourth Medita?
 tion it does not since there is then available a com?
 pelling argument against this supposition and none
 in its favor. Frankfurt construes Descartes as con?
 cerned to counter the sceptic's claim that the use of
 reason leads to the conclusion that reason is un?
 reliable, that there are good reasons for being
 suspicious of the value of good reasons. The
 Cartesian reply is that a scrupulous use of reason
 leads rather to the conclusion that reason is reliable.
 Such, in its broad outlines, is Frankfurt's recon?
 struction of the Cartesian position. So far, the
 reconstruction strikes me as both correct and very
 illuminating. Indeed, I would be more sanguine
 than Frankfurt is about the ability of this approach
 to deal with the philosophical difficulty. But there
 is a good deal in the detailed development of
 Frankfurt's position, particularly in (4), which is
 open to objection.
 Frankfurt allows that Descartes' conclusion?
 that it would never be reasonable to doubt what we
 perceive clearly and distinctly?may be true with?
 out its being the case that all our clear and distinct
 ideas are true. And he cites a passage from the
 Second Replies in which Descartes appears to admit
 the possibility that what we intuit is false even
 though we have no reasonable grounds for suspect?
 ing error. He interprets Descartes as being more
 concerned with the solidity and permanence of his
 beliefs than he is with their "truth" in any ab?
 solute sense. The logic of Descartes' position leads
 to a coherence, rather than a correspondence,
 theory of truth, and it is the coherence of our care?
 fully adopted beliefs which God's veracity guaran?
 tees. Applying this to the question of the status of
 scientific theories, a vital problem for Descartes and
 his contemporaries because of the controversy be?
 tween the "two great systems" of astronomy,
 Frankfurt suggests that the Meditations imply a
 Kantian solution to the problem: "men may con?
 tent themselves with certainty about the phenom?
 ena and leave the noumena to God."
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 This is a strange conclusion for an author who
 has emphasized Descartes' role as the opponent of
 scepticism. Popkin (34) cites the same passage from
 the Second Replies and reads it in the same manner.
 But he treats it as a critical and damaging concession
 to scepticism. And so it seems to be as Popkin and
 Frankfurt read it. This gives us a good reason, I
 think, for seeking an alternative interpretation of
 the Second Replies. Further grounds are provided by
 the Principles, where Descartes takes up an explicit
 position on the Copernican controversy which can?
 not, I think, be reconciled with the position
 Frankfurt finds implicit in the Meditations. But this
 issue is too complex to be argued here.
 If Hintikka, Popkin, and Frankfurt have done
 much for our understanding of the cogito and the
 circle, perhaps the most important contribution of
 Kenny's excellent book on Descartes (8) lies in his
 discussion of the ontological argument. The classic
 objection to the argument, raised, in effect, by
 Gassendi, well before Kant?is that existence is not
 a property. What seems to lie behind this objection
 (cf. Alston (1)) is the view that the existence of a
 subject of predication is a necessary condition for
 predicating any property, either truly or falsely, of
 the subject. If that view is correct, and if existence
 is a property, then we can never make false positive
 existential statements or true negative ones. But
 this is patently false. Thus, existence is not a
 property.
 Kenny argues that Descartes' reply would be to
 reject the view that true or false predications of
 properties require an existing subject. We have a
 priori knowledge of, and therefore can make true
 predications about, the objects studied in geometry.
 It does not matter that there are not now, never
 have been, and never will be any such objects. All
 that is required is that the objects be possible
 objects. So Kenny interprets Descartes as being
 committed to something like Meinongian pure ob?
 jects as subjects of predication. These objects are
 not to be regarded in a conceptualistic fashion.
 Their esse is not cogitari. Rather they impose a
 necessity on thought.
 Kenny does not claim that this is, in the end, a
 satisfactory way of rebutting the classical objection.
 Though he holds that Descartes' version of the
 theory of pure objects avoids some of the difficulties
 Meinong's encounters, he thinks there are in?
 surmountable difficulties in the notion of non?
 existent possible individuals, and cites Quine's con?
 tention that we lack satisfactory identity conditions
 for pure objects.
 Moreover, Kenny maintains Descartes' answer
 gives rise to serious internal difficulties in the
 Cartesian system. If the ontological argument is
 not to be circular, it must be possible to prove
 properties of the problematically existent. But if so,
 then what happens to the cogito? If "This triangle
 has its three angles equal to two right angles, so
 this triangle exists" is not valid, then the inference,
 "I think, so I exist" cannot be valid. Conversely,
 if the inference from thought to existence is valid,
 then Descartes cannot prove that the triangle (or
 God) has certain properties without first knowing
 whether the triangle exists. Kenny concludes that
 the cogito and the ontological argument cannot both
 be valid, which he regards as a major problem for
 the Cartesian system.
 As far as the interpretation of Descartes goes, I
 think Kenny is quite right to attribute a theory of
 possible objects to Descartes. This is argued in
 more detail in (9) than in (8) and it seems to me
 to be supported even more strongly by a passage
 Kenny does not cite (AT V, 160). But it is not
 clear that the theory cannot be defended for some
 distance against Quinean objections, or that it is
 inconsistent with the cogito. Presumably one wants
 to make the subject predicate distinction both with
 actual objects and with possible objects. As Kenny
 himself remarks, though "neither Pegasus nor
 Pegasus' shape exists . . . Pegasus is a non-existent
 substance, whereas Pegasus' shape is a non?
 existent mode" (7). The crucial question is
 whether the thinking which is posited in the
 premiss of the cogito is posited as an existent mode.
 If it is, then it will require an existent substance to
 inhere in.
 As for the queries about whether the possible fat
 man in the doorway is identical with the possible
 bald man in the doorway, it might be argued that
 these descriptions are not sufficiently definite for us
 to be able to answer identity-questions about their
 referents (Cf. Rescher, (35)). Is the Bronte sister
 who wrote novels identical with the British
 authoress who was a younger sister ? How could we
 possibly decide? Neither description picks out just
 one individual, even if we restrict ourselves to the
 actual. If we allow our descriptions to range over
 non-existent possible individuals, then no putatively
 definite description will pick out just one individual
 unless it is a complete description in the Leibnizian
 sense. So we should not expect to be able to answer,
 or even satisfactorily frame, specific identity
 questions about possible individuals, though we
 might be able to say that in general two possible
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 individuals are identical if their individual con
 cepts are identical. In the end the difficulties tht
 ontological argument involves concern the prin?
 ciple of the identity of indiscernibles and the
 notion of a complete individual concept. So th(
 confrontation of Descartes with 20th century ob?
 jections leads very quickly to reflection on the
 problems of the Leibnizian system.
 II. Spinoza
 In the recent literature on Descartes, there is a
 considerable body of works whose virtues are as
 much philosophical as they are scholarly in the
 sense that these works offer as much to interest
 someone for whom philosophy effectively begins in
 this century as they do to interest one whose pri?
 mary concern is with what Descartes' views really
 were. There is not yet a comparable body of
 philosophical scholarship on Spinoza, whose study
 remains more the preserve of historians who are not
 at the same time deeply involved in contemporary
 debates. There is, nonetheless, a great deal of
 interesting recent work, the bulk of which is
 French, and the most significant of which, clearly,
 is Martial Gueroult's massive three volume study
 of the Ethics (33). So far only the first volume, deal?
 ing with Part I of the Ethics, has appeared. But it is
 already plain that the work will be of immense
 value to students of Spinoza. In his nearly 600
 pages of commentary on the 39 pages of Spinoza's
 text, there is hardly any important problem of
 interpretation which he does not discuss, and in
 some measure at least, illuminate.
 The central theme of Gueroult's work, which
 guides both his analysis of the structure of De De0
 and his interpretation of its doctrines, is Spinoza's
 rationalism. Rationalism is understood here, not as
 a doctrine about the possibility of synthetic a priori
 knowledge, but as an affirmation of the complete
 intelligibility for man of the essences of all things,
 both finite and infinite. Gueroult rightly makes this
 the primary article of faith for Spinozism, and he
 draws from it a number of important conclusions,
 of which I shall comment on two which I find
 particularly interesting.
 The first concerns the relation of the attributes to
 substance. Gueroult's stress on the absolute in?
 telligibility of God in Spinoza's system leads him to
 reject strongly the "subjectivist" interpretation of
 the attributes according to which the attributes
 have no real existence in the essence of God, but are
 only "subjective modes of thinking," ways in
 which the mind conceives a simple reality which lies
 forever beyond its grasp, like a Kantian noumenon.
 Gueroult devotes a long and (to my mind) entirely
 successful appendix to a detailed refutation of the
 case for this widespread misinterpretation.
 Gueroult's own interpretation conceives Spin?
 oza's substance as a complex whole whose essence
 is constituted by an infinity of really distinct ele?
 ments, the attributes, each of which satisfies in its
 own right the definition of substance. So substance
 is identical with the totality of its attributes, and
 each attribute both exists in itself and is conceived
 through itself. This is very similar to a position I
 have argued for myself (31), but Gueroult is able to
 support it with textual evidence I missed (e.g.,
 E IP29S which says quite explicitly that the
 attributes exist in themselves) and takes up prob?
 lems inherent in it which I neglected. As Gueroult
 points out, a good many objections to Spinozism
 can be shown to rest on a misunderstanding if this
 interpretation is accepted (p. 120). But it is not
 without difficulties of its own.
 If each of the attributes is really distinct from
 every other attribute and if each satisfies the
 definition of substance, then it is not easy to see
 why we should not say that the attributes constitute
 an infinity of distinct substances rather than one
 substance. This is a central objection to any
 interpretation like Gueroult's and providing an
 answer to it is one of his main preoccupations in the
 first half of his commentary. If I understand him,
 his reply is this. If we considered the attributes
 separately, in abstraction from the concept of God
 as an absolutely infinite being, then it would be
 perfectly correct to think of each of the attributes as
 a distinct substance, existing in itself and conceived
 through itself. But once we conceive the idea of an
 ens realissimum, of a being whose nature it is to
 consist of infinitely many attributes and whose
 existence follows from that nature, then we are
 obliged to conceive of the attributes as con?
 stituents of one being and not as a mere collection of
 substances. God's existence does not result from
 the necessary existence of each of the elements
 which constitute his nature. It is rather their
 existence together which results from his necessary
 existence (p. 184)?or, as I think Gueroult would
 add, from his necessary existence as an indivisible
 and unique being, the elements of whose nature
 cannot be conceived as separable from it (p. 220),
 a being which excludes the existence of any other
 substance (p. 226).
 Whether or not this will be regarded as an
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 ultimately satisfactory reply to the objection,
 Gueroult offers good reason for supposing that it
 was essentially Spinoza's reply. I might add that,
 given the necessary existence of each of the attri?
 butes considered in itself, the question of their
 existing as a collection of really distinct substances
 in the Cartesian sense of "real distinction" cannot
 arise. For though the attributes are not dependent
 on one another for their existence, nevertheless,
 since each attribute exists necessarily, it is simply
 not possible that one should exist without the
 others. Gueroult would not, I suspect, regard this
 as being an adequate explanation of their unity in
 one substance, but it does point up the fact that,
 even when considered as a collection the attributes
 are a very special sort of collection.
 The second conclusion of Gueroult's which I
 want to comment on concerns his interpretation of
 the infinite modes, which seems to me to raise very
 serious difficulties. Spinoza's rationalism, he argues,
 requires that the human intellect be regarded, not
 as an effect of God's intellect, but as a part of it
 (p. 404). In this way any radical discrepancy be?
 tween God's conception and man's (such as was
 contemplated by Descartes) is effectively blocked.
 The divine intellect, of which the human intellect is
 a part, does not pertain to natura naturans (i.e., the
 attributes) but to natura naturata (i.e., the modes)
 and is identified by Gueroult with (both) the in?
 finite modes of the attribute of thought. On
 Gueroult's reading the immediate infinite mode of
 thought is the totality of thought essences (essences
 pens?es, p. 318), or the universe of eternal ideas,
 whereas the mediate infinite mode of thought is the
 totality of finite modes of thought existing in
 duration. Any existing finite intellect is a part of
 the mediate infinite mode of thought; its eternal
 idea is a part of the immediate infinite mode of
 thought; and these two modes constitute the
 intellect of God. A similar analysis is applied to the
 infinite modes of extension.
 Gueroult presents a case for this interpretation
 which is as well-documented as we could reason?
 ably expect, considering how little Spinoza is pre?
 pared to tell us about the infinite modes, and it may
 be that he is right on the point of interpretation.
 But if he is, then Spinoza's doctrine of the nature of
 these modes looks inconsistent with what he holds
 concerning their causation. For as I've argued (31)
 and as Gueroult would seem to agree (p. 313 et
 passim), Spinoza's doctrine is that the attributes are
 in themselves adequate causes only of their infinite
 modes, but are not, in themselves, adequate causes
 of their finite modes, whose production requires, as
 a further condition, the existence of other finite
 modes. But surely if an attribute is an adequate
 cause of a whole, it cannot at the same time fail to
 be an adequate cause of the individual parts ofthat
 whole. So if Spinoza does conceive of the finite
 modes as parts of the infinite modes, then his system
 is inconsistent.
 We might note in this connection that Gueroult
 makes virtually no use of the notion of the laws of
 nature in his explication of Spinoza. I have been
 able to locate only one reference to laws (p. 250),
 and there they are identified with the series of
 finite things. No grounds for this are offered, and it
 does appear to be inconsistent with TdlE, 100-101,
 where the laws are said to be inscribed in the fixed
 and eternal things, which are sharply distinguished
 from the series of singular mutable things. This
 latter passage may offer the key to a different and
 more satisfactory interpretation of the infinite
 modes. But this is too complex an issue to be de?
 bated here.
 III. Malebranche
 The most striking thing about recent work on
 Malebranche is that it is no longer a peculiarly
 French preoccupation. The first 60 years of this
 century saw only one full-length study of Male
 branche in English and very few in any other non
 French language. The past decade alone has added
 three more in English: Rome's (29), Walton's (30)
 and ConnelPs (23), and one in Italian, Nicolosi's
 (25). Besides these there are substantial French
 works by Rodis-Lewis (28) and Robinet (26, 27),
 and the papers collected in Malebranche : UHomme
 et r oeuvre (22). We can certainly not complain that
 Malebranche is being neglected by the scholars,
 though we might wish that their work would reach
 a wider audience. Malebranche is too interesting
 and important a figure to be left to the historians.
 One of the principal issues in the flood of materials
 centers on the continuity of Malebranche's thought.
 There has been a tendency in French scholar?
 ship, aided recently by the new critical edition
 of the complete works (24), to emphasize the
 discontinuities, to agree with Arnauld in seeing
 a very different doctrine of the vision in God
 after the 10th Eclaircissement than was offered in
 La recherche de la v?rit?. E.g., Robinet's work (27) is
 a detailed elaboration of five distinct stages in
 Malebranche's development, with a most important
 break occurring in what Robinet calls "la crise de
This content downloaded from 
             141.211.4.224 on Tue, 28 Jul 2020 22:55:38 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 242  AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
 1677." Before 1677, Malebranche conceives th<
 ideas we see in God as particular, finite, createc
 beings, a conception inspired in part by th<
 Cartesian doctrine of the creation of the eterna
 truths. After 1677, in response to the criticisms o
 Foucher, Malebranche rejects the doctrine of th(
 creation of the eternal truths and conceives what h
 seen in God as the unique idea of intelligible ex?
 tension, infinite, general, and uncreated, bui
 capable of representing the essences of all materia!
 things.
 By contrast, the tendency of English language
 scholars, like Rome and Connell, has been tc
 emphasize the continuities, treating the latei
 versions of the doctrine as simply logical develop?
 ments of the earlier versions. In this they may find
 encouragement in the work of Mme. Rodis-Lewis,
 who sees Malebranche's thought as evolving so
 gradually that the change is almost imperceptible.
 In particular she has been sceptical of Robinet's
 notion of a crisis of 1677, questioning whether
 Malebranche ever accepted the creation of eternal
 truths. See not only her (28), but also her contribu?
 tion to (22), followed by a discussion with Gouhier,
 Robinet, and Gueroult, among others.
 IV. Leibniz
 One of the interesting features of recent work on
 Leibniz is the extent to which it has been concerned
 with the reassessment of the critical works of
 Russell and Couturat, which are now some 70
 years old. Though there has been a growing dis?
 position to disagree with Russell's and Couturat's
 conclusions, nevertheless their work has provided a
 focus for much that has been written in the past
 decade. So, e.g., Kauppi (18) argues that Couturat's
 account of Leibniz' logic was distorted by Coutu?
 rat's own preference for the extensional point of
 view, a preference characteristic of the period in
 which Couturat wrote, but which would not be so
 widely shared by logicians today. Similarly,
 Parkinson (20) takes up Russell's claim that
 Leibniz' metaphysics was almost entirely derived
 from his logic and subjects it to a very patient
 examination, culminating in the (perhaps not very
 surprising) conclusion that Russell's list of Leibniz'
 premisses is quite defective. Criticism of Russell and
 Couturat is also prominent in Rescher's work on
 Leibniz (21) and in the recently published mono?
 graph by Hide Ishiguro (17). These are perhaps
 the most important recent monographs on Leibniz,
 but as befits a philosopher who is not being left to
 ? the historians, there are also a considerable number
 I of interesting articles on Leibniz, many of which
 ? are collected in Frankfurt's anthology in the Anchor
 I series (14).
 f Out of all this discussion there are a number of
 ; areas in which the conclusions of Russell and
 ; Gouturat are being reversed. One concerns the
 problem of contingency and the principle of
 sufficient reason. Gouturat had argued, and had
 persuaded Russell, whose earlier views were
 different, that the principle of sufficient reason was
 given by the formula: all true propositions are
 analytic. Gouturat would not allow any exceptions
 to this doctrine for existential propositions or any
 place in Leibniz' philosophy for final causes. The
 only difference between necessary and contingent
 truths was that the analysis of contingent truths
 involved an infinite process which surpassed the
 powers of the human mind. So the system had a
 distinctly Spinozistic tendency.
 Recent discussions by Parkinson (20), Rescher
 (21), and myself (14) have tended in some measure
 to go back to Russell's original view (before
 Gouturat) that, apart from the proposition that
 God exists, existential truths are not analytic.
 Though both Parkinson (p. 106) and Rescher (p.
 25) do, in various places, ascribe to Leibniz the view
 that all truths are analytic, they both also make
 an exception for existential truths about finite
 individuals (Parkinson, p. 107; Rescher, p. 18).
 And to the extent that they identify the principle of
 sufficient reason with the doctrine that all truths
 are analytic, they argue that it needs to be supple?
 mented by a further principle?the principle of
 perfection or the best, which turns out to involve
 the assertion that God, in creating the world,
 chose to act in the best possible way. So final
 causes are, in the end, re-instated.
 But very divergent views have been held about
 the status of this further principle. Parkinson
 argues (p. 109) that according to Leibniz, it is
 necessary (absolutely, not just hypothetically) that
 God should choose the best. Parkinson does not
 think this excludes the contingency of the world,
 since other worlds remain possible (i.e. free from
 contradiction in their own nature) even if they are
 not possible in relation to God's will. I, on the
 other hand, have argued (p. 95) that God's choice
 of the best does not follow from his nature, and
 Rescher has taken an intermediate position, holding
 that prior to 1686 Leibniz held God's choice to be
 necessary, but that after that date?which is
 generally agreed on as the date by which Leibniz'
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 mature philosophy had taken form?he regarded
 God's choice as contingent (p. 69).
 One thing which emerges clearly from this is that
 in different places Leibniz expressed contradictory
 opinions. Both the necessity and the contingency of
 God's choice can be supported textually. What is
 not clear is that the texts supporting necessity can
 be separated neatly from those supporting con?
 tingency on the basis of their date. Some of the
 texts Parkinson relies on are dated as late as 1698,
 whereas the one I had emphasized is dated (tenta?
 tively, it is true) 1680-1682. Leibniz would appear
 to have vacillated on this issue. It is worth pointing
 out, however, that the line of defense which Parkin?
 son stresses is not a very satisfactory one. It is an
 uncontroversial truth of modal logic that if p is
 necessary and p entails q, then q is necessary. So if
 it is (absolutely) necessary that God choose the
 best, and if the existence of the best world is (hypo
 thetically) necessary in relation to his choice, then
 it is (absolutely) necessary that the best world exist.
 The alternative view, according to which God's
 choice is contingent, may be unattractive in its own
 way, but I do not think it is incoherent.
 Another topic which has been the focus of a great
 deal of attention lately is Leibniz' doctrine of rela?
 tions. Russell had been sharply critical of Leibniz
 on this point,2 though he was hardly precise or
 consistent in defining the doctrine he wished to
 attack, sometimes ascribing to Leibniz the view that
 putatively relational propositions were "no propo?
 sitions at all" or were "meaningless," and some?
 times ascribing to him the view that they were re?
 ducible to non-relational propositions. Both Parkin?
 son (20) and Rescher (21) reject the former, more
 extreme view, but agree with Russell in attributing
 the latter, weaker thesis to Leibniz. And they also
 agree with Russell in holding that even the weaker
 thesis can easily be refuted by reference to asym?
 metric relations. A similar interpretation is offered
 by Mates (19).
 The most recent studies of this topic, however,
 suggest that Leibniz did not hold even the weaker
 thesis. Thus both Hintikka (15) and Ishiguro (16,
 17) argue that, insofar as Leibniz did have a
 reductionist program, it seems to have involved the
 reduction of relational propositions which refer
 explicitly to more than one individual to proposi?
 tions which ascribe complex, implicitly relational
 predicates to one subject. The implicitly relational
 predicates would not involve a specific reference to
 other individuals, though they would "conceal"
 bound variables. So, for example, "Paris loves
 Helen" would be rendered by some such para?
 phrase as "Paris loves and, eo ipso, Helen is loved."
 The predicates used in the paraphrase are im?
 plicitly relational because "Paris loves" is to be
 regarded as short for (3x) (Paris loves x).
 This interpretation does seem easier to reconcile
 with Leibniz' various attempts at the reduction of
 relational propositions and has the added merit of
 ascribing to Leibniz a program which is not ob?
 viously impossible to carry out. No doubt the con?
 nective "and eo ipso" is not truth-functional, but
 that would hardly be an objection which Leibniz
 would regard as a serious one. What is more diffi?
 cult is to see the motivation for what Ishiguro calls
 "the re-writing project."
 Other areas in which familiar interpretations of
 Leibniz are being challenged involve such topics as
 "Leibniz' Law" and his attitude toward singular
 propositions referring to non-actual possibles. E.g.,
 Mates (19) has called attention to passages in
 which Leibniz showed himself to be aware that the
 principle of substitutivity salva veritate (eadem sunt
 quorum unum alteri substitu? potest, salva veritate) re?
 quires qualification in certain contexts. Mates has
 also suggested that the substitutivity principle might
 be intended, not as a criterion of identity for indi?
 viduals, but as a criterion of identity for concepts.
 Mates does not argue for this himself, but it has
 subsequently been argued for by Feldman ( 13) and
 Ishiguro ( 17). I find Miss Ishiguro's arguments more
 persuasive than Feldman's, but it does seem an
 awkward feature of her interpretation that con?
 cept-identity does not entail the synonymy of the
 words that express the concept. So the concepts
 triangle and trilateral are the same, even though
 the words "triangle" and "trilateral" do not mean
 the same. And yet Leibniz says that by a concept he
 means what is signified by a name.
 Perhaps more startling is another conclusion
 which Mates (19) does explicitly argue for. In
 attempting to describe Leibniz' conceptual frame?
 work and to incorporate his interpretation in the
 semantics of a formalized language, Mates ascribes
 to Leibniz " a decision to regard as false every atomic
 sentence that contains a non-denoting name." As
 evidence Mates cites the dictum, "Nothing has no
 properties," which he interprets as committing
 2 Gouturat however, had seen Leibniz as a precursor of De Morgan, Peirce and Schr?der in the development of a logic of
 relations. Cf. La Logique de Leibniz, p. 303 n.
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 Leibniz to this policy. But surely Ishiguro is right
 ( 17) to attempt to reinstate the more usual interpre?
 tation of this dictum. We might note that Descartes,
 too, subscribes to the maxim that nothing has no
 properties. But as Kenny has recently emphasized,
 it is a key doctrine of Descartes that we can make
 true predications about the non-existent.
 The above is hardly an exhaustive account of
 recent work on 17 th century Continental philoso?
 phy. Much that is interesting has been left out for
 reasons of space and I am sure that I have missed
 much that would have been interesting. But perhaps
 the accompanying bibliography can make up some
 of the deficiencies of this survey.
 The Australian National University Received August 30, igf?
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 certainty and the 'natural light'." Aust. J.P., vol.
 48, 1970: 116-119.
 -"Descartes and Probable Knowledge."JHP, vol. 8,
 I970-303-3?2.
 Muralt, A. de. " Epoch?-Malin G?nie?Th?ologie de la
 toute-puissance divine. Le concept objectif sans
 objet, Recherche d'une structure de pens?e."
 [Husserl, Descartes, Occam] St. P, vol. 26, 1966:
 I59-I9I
 N?dor, G. "L'importance de la doctrine heuristique de
 Descartes dans l'histoire de la science." Dial, vol. 16,
 1962: 25-38.
 Nakhnikian, G. "The cartesian circle revisited." APQ,
 vol. 4, 1967: 251-255.
 Nelson, J. O. "In defence of Descartes: squaring a re?
 puted circle." Dial., vol. 3, 1964: 262-272. See also
 Frankfurt, H. G., "A reply to Mr Nelson," Dial.,
 vol. 4, 1965-66: 92-95, and Morris, J. "A plea for
 the French Descartes," Dial., vol. 6, 1967: 236-239.
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 Norton, D. F. "Descartes on unknown faculties: an
 essential inconsistency." JHP, vol. 6, 1968: 245-256.
 Picardi, F. // concetto di metafisica nel razionalismo cartesiano.
 Milan, Editore Marzorati, 1971.
 Powell, B. "Descartes' Machines." PAS, vol. 71, 1970
 1971: 209-222.
 Quinton, A. "Matter and space." Mind, vol. 73, 1964:
 332-353
 Rod, W. Descartes, Die innere Genesis des cartesianischen
 Systems. Basel/M?nchen, Ernst Reinhardt Verlag,
 1964.
 (10) - "Zum Problem des premier principe in
 Descartes' Metaphysik." K. St., vol. 51, 1959-60:
 I76-I95
 - "Zur Problematik der Gotteserkenntnis bei Des?
 cartes ['Le cercle cart?sien']." AGP, vol. 43, 1961 :
 128-152.
 Rodis-Lewis, G. "La domaine propre de l'homme chez
 les Cart?siens." JHP, vol. 2, 1964: 157-188.
 Salmon, E. G. "Mathematical roots of Cartesian meta?
 physics." JVS, vol. 39, No. 2, 1965: 158-169.
 Schall, J. V. " Cartesianism and political theory."
 R. Pol., vol. 24, 1962: 260-282.
 Scholz, H. Mathesis Universalis, Abhandlungen zur
 Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft, Basel, 1961.
 *Sebba, G. Bibliographia cartesiana: a critical guide to the
 Descartes literature 1800-igoo. The Hague, M.
 Nijhoff, 1964.
 - "Some open problems in Descartes' research."
 MLN, vol. 75, i960: 222-229.
 Sesonske, A. and Fleming, B. N., eds. Meta-meditations.
 Studies in Descartes. Belmont, California, Wadworth,
 1965
 Shapere, D. "Descartes and Plato," JHI, vol. 24, Octo?
 ber 1963: 572-576.
 Thi?baut, M. "Descartes masqu??", RP, vol. 67, i960:
 136-152.
 Turbayne, C. M. The myth of metaphor. New Haven, Yale
 University Press, 1962.
 Vuillemin, J. Math?matiques et m?taphysique chez Descartes.
 Paris, Presses universitaires de France, i960.
 - "Sur les propri?t?s formelles et mat?rielles de
 l'ordre cart?sien des raisons." In Homage ? Martial
 Gueroult. Uhistoire de la philosophie, ses probl?mes, ses
 m?thodes. Paris, Fischbacher, 1964: 43-58.
 (11) Weinberg, J. R. " Some reflections on Mr Hintikka's
 article." PR, vol. 71, 1962: 483-491.
 GALILEO
 Apolin, A. "Galilei-Studien." PN, vol. 9, 1965: 213
 229.
 Ariotti, P. "Galileo on the isochrony of the pendulum."
 Isis, vol. 59, 1968: 414-426.
 Bernardini, G. "L'influenza di Galileo sulla filosof?a
 naturale moderna." De Homine, 1965: 47-58.
 Broderick, J. Galileo: the man, his work, his misfortunes.
 New York, Harper and Row, 1965.
 Broglie, L. d. Galil?e et Vaurore de la science moderne. Paris,
 Universit? de Paris, Palais de la D?couverte, 1965.
 Burstyn, H. L. "Galileo's attempt to prove that the
 earth moves." Isis, vol. 53, June 1962: 161-185;
 Reply, E. J. Aiton, vol. 54, June 1963: 265-266;
 Rejoinder, vol. 54, Sept. 1963: 400-401 ; Comments,
 E. J. Aiton, vol. 56, Spring, 1965: 56-61 ; Reply, 61
 63.
 Camp anale, D. "Esperienza e ragione nel pensiero di
 Galilei." GM, vol. 19, 1964: 753-778.
 Carbonara, C La vita e il pensiero di Galileo Galilei,
 Napoli, Libr. scientifica ?ditrice, 1963.
 Castelli, E., ed. Cusano e Galileo, Padova, Cedan, 1964.
 Clavelin, M. La philosophie naturelle de Gallil?e. Essai sur
 les origines et la formation de la m?canique
 classique. Paris, A. Colin, 1968.
 Cohen, I. B. "The dynamics of the Galileo-'Plato'
 problem." In IXe Congr?s international d'Histoire des
 Sciences (Barcelona-Madrid 1-7 September, 1959).
 Actes. Paris, Hermann, i960: 187-196.
 De Santillana, G. Fortune di Galileo. Bari, Laterza, 1964.
 Biblioteca di cultura moderna, 586.
 -"Galileo today." In his Reflections on men and ideas.
 Cambridge, Massachusetts, Institute of Technology,
 1968: 57-70
 Drake, S. "Galileo's 1604 fragment on falling bodies
 (Galileo gleanings)." BJHS, vol. 4, December 1969:
 340-358.
 -"Mathematics, astronomy and physics in the work
 of Galileo." In Art, science and history in the Renaissance.
 Edited by C. S. Singleton, Baltimore, Johns
 Hopkins, 1967: 305-330.
 Dubarle, A. M. "Les principes ex?g?tiques et th?olo?
 giques de Galil?e concernant la science de la
 nature." RSPT, vol. 50, 1966: 67-87.
 Galilei, Galileo. Galileo Galilei on motion and on mechanics.
 Translated by I. E. Drabkin; introduction and notes
 by S. Drake. Madison, University of Wisconsin
 Press, i960.
 Galli, G. Uidea di materia e di scienza f?sica da T?lete a
 Galileo. Torino, G. Giappichelli-Editore, 1963.
 Geymonat, L. Galileo Galilei: a biography and inquiry into
 his philosophy of science. Translated with notes by S.
 Drake. Foreword by G. de Santillana. New York,
 McGraw-Hill, 1965. Review, McMullin, E. MS,
 vol. 47, 1970: 195-209.
 Gilbert, N. W. "Galileo and the school of Padua."
 JHP, vol. 1, 1963: 223-231.
 Hall, A. R. "Galileo and the science of motion." BJHS,
 vol. 2, 1965: 185-199.
 Hanson, N. R. "Galileo's discoveries in dynamics."
 Science, vol. 147, 1965: 471-478.
 Heintel, E. "Galilei und Kant." PN, vol. 9, 1965: 191 ?
 212.
 Humphries, W. C. "Galileo, falling bodies and inclined
 planes. An attempt at reconstructing Galileo's dis?
 covery of the law of squares." BJHS, vol. 3, No. 11,
 1967: 225-244.
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 Kaplon, M. (ed.). Homage to Galileo. Cambridge, Mass.,
 M.I.T. Press, 1965.
 Langford, J. J. Galileo, science and the church. Foreword by
 S. Drake. New York, Descl?e, 1966.
 Losee, J. "Drake, Galileo and the law of inertia." Am.
 J. Phys., vol. 34, No. 5, 1966: 430-342.
 MoRPURGO Tagliabue, G. Iprocessi di Galileo e Vepistemo?
 log?a. Milano, Edizioni di Comunit?, 1963.
 Namer, E. " Le copernicanisme exp?rimental de Galil?e."
 RPFE, vol. 155, 1965: 217-228, 359-378.
 Salmon, E. "Galileo: physics and philosophy." IPQ,
 vol. 2, 1962: 621-628.
 Shea, W. R. J. "Galileo's claim to fame: the proof that
 the earth moves from the evidence of the tides."
 BJHS, vol. 5, 1970: 111-127.
 GASSENDI
 Gassendi, P. Disquisitio metaphysica seu dubitationes et
 instantiae adversus Renati cartesii metaphysicam et respon
 sam. Texte ?tabli, traduit et annot? par B. Rochot,
 Paris, J. Vrin, 1962.
 Gregory, T. Scetticismo ed empirismo?Studio su Gassendi.
 Bari, Laterza, 1961.
 GEULINCX
 De Vleeschauwer, H. J. Le probl?me du suicide dans la
 morale d'Arnold Geulincx. Pretoria, University of
 South Africa, 1965.
 -Le "De virtute et primis ejus Proprietatibus" d'Arnout
 Geulincx et sa traduction flamande. Van de Hoof
 deuchden. Introduction et textes. Pretoria, Van
 Schaick, 1961.
 - "L?gica genuina ou le purisme logique. Kant et
 Geulincx." In Kritik und Metaphysik. Studien.
 Heinz Heimsoeth zum 80. Geburtstag. Hrsg. von F.
 Kaulbach und J. Ritter. Berlin, de Gruyter, 1966:
 159-173.
 - Plans d'?tudes au XVIIe si?cle, II: Le plan d'?tudes
 d'Arnold Geulincx. Pretoria, University of South
 Africa, 1964.
 D?rr, K. "Arnold Geulincx und die klassische Logik des
 17 Jahrhunderts." Studium gen?rale, vol. 18, 1965:
 520-541.
 Lattre, A. de. L'occasionalisme d'Arnold Geulincx, ?tude sur
 la constitution de la doctrine. Paris, Editions de minuit,
 1967.
 GROTIUS
 Auge, G. "Le contrat et l'?volution du consensualisme
 chez Grotius." APD, vol. 13, 1968: 99-114.
 Bull, H. "The Grotian conception of international
 society." In Butterfield, H. and Wight, M., eds.,
 Diplomatie investigations. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
 University Press, 1966: 51-73.
 De Michelis, F. Le origini storiche e cult?rale del pensieri di
 Ugo Grozio. Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1967.
 Droetto, A. Studi groziani. Pref. di N. Bobbio. Torino,
 Giappichelli, 1968.
 Figgis, J. N. Political thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414
 1625. Introduction by G. Mattingly. New York,
 Harper, i960.
 Grotius, H. The law of war and peace. Books I, II, III.
 Translated by F. W. Kelsey, with introduction by
 J. B. Scott. New York, Liberal Arts Press, [s.d.].
 Tooke, J. D. The just war in Aquinas and Grotius. London,
 Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1965.
 KEPLER
 Armitage, A. John Kepler. London, Faber and Faber,
 1966.
 Gerlach, W. and List, M. Johannes Kepler, Leben und
 Werk. M?nchen, R. Piper, 1966.
 Hanson, N. R. "Copernican disturbance and the
 Keplerian revolution." JHI, vol. 22, 1961: 169-184.
 Holton, G. Johannes Kepler et les origines philosophiques de la
 physique moderne. Paris, Palais de la d?couverte, 1961.
 Knight, D. C. Johannes Kepler and planetary motion. New
 York, F. Watts, 1962.
 Koestler, A. "Kepler and the psychology of discovery."
 In Grene, Marjorie, ed. The logic of personal knowl?
 edge. London, Routledge, 1961.
 -Watershed: a biography of Johannes Kepler. New York,
 Doubleday, i960.
 Koyre, A. La r?volution astronomique: Copernic, Kepler,
 Borelli. Paris, Hermann, 1961.
 Rosen, E. (tr.) Somnium. Madison, University of Wis?
 consin Press, 1967.
 Rosen, S. The harmonious world of Johann Kepler. Boston,
 Little and Brown, 1962.
 Schneer, C. J. "The end of Plato's problem." In his
 The search for order. New York, Harper and Row,
 i960: 81-90.
 LEIBNIZ
 Aarsleff, H. "Leibniz on Locke on Language." APQ,
 vol. 1, 1964: 165-188.
 Agassi, J. "Leibniz's place in the history of physics."
 JHI, vol. 30, 1969: 331-344
 Angelelli, I. "On identity and interchangeability in
 Leibniz and Frege." NDJFL, vol. 8, 1967: 94-100.
 Arndt, H. W. "Die Entwicklungsstufen von Leibniz'
 Begriff einer Lingua Universalis." In Achter Deut?
 schen Kongress f?r Philosophic (Heidelberg, 1966). Das
 Problem der Sprache, M?nchen, Wilhelm Fink
 Verlag, 1967: 71-79.
 Ballard, K. E. "Leibniz's theory of space and time."
 JHI, vol. 21, i960: 49-65.
 Beck, L. W. Early German Philosophy. Cambridge, Massa?
 chusetts, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
 1969: 196-240 devoted to Leibniz.
Belaval, Y. "Le probl?me de l'erreur chez Leibniz."
 ZPF, vol. 20, 1966: 381-396.
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 - L'id?e d'harmonie chez Leibniz. In Etudes sur
 Vhistoire de la philosophie en hommage ? Martial Gueroult.
 Paris, Fischbacher, 1964: 59-78.
 Brooks, R. A. Voltaire and Leibniz. Gen?ve, Droz, 1964.
 Buchdahl, G. "Minimum Principles in Science and
 Philosophy during the 17th and 18th Centuries." In
 Proceedings of the tenth international congress of History of
 Science, Ithaca, ig62. Herman, Paris, 1964.
 Castelnuovo, G. Le origini del calc?lo infinitesimale neWera
 modern. Con scritti di Newton, Leibniz, Torricelli.
 Pref. di U. Forti. Milano, G. Feltrinelli, 1962.
 CiONE, E. Leibniz. Napoli, Liberia scientifica ?ditrice,
 1964.
 Costabel, P. Leibniz et la dynamique: les textes de 1692.
 Paris, Hermann, i960.
 Cunningham, G. W. "On reason's reach, historical
 observations." APQ, vol. 6, 1969: 1-16.
 (12) Curley, E. M. The root of contingency. In Frankfurt
 (24).
 de Vleeschauwer, H. J. Perennis quaedam philosophia.
 Pretoria, Communications of the University of South
 Africa, Vol. I, Ex?g?se, 1968; Vol. II, Ant?c?dents,
 1969.
 Erickson, S. A. "Leibniz on essence, existence and
 creation." RM, vol. 18, 1965: 476-487.
 (13) Feldman, F. "Leibniz and 'Leibniz' Law'." PR,
 vol. 79, 1970: 510-522. Reply, Curley, PR, vol. 80,
 i97i:497-50i.
 (14) Frankfurt, H. G. Leibniz, a collection of critical
 essays. Garden City, New York, Anchor, 1972.
 Furth, M. "Monadology." PR, vol. 76., 1967: 169-200.
 Reprinted in Frankfurt (14).
 Gould, J. A. "The concept of absolute space." JHI, vol.
 22, 1961: 119-120.
 Grimsley, R. "Kierkegaard and Leibniz." JHI, vol. 26,
 1965: 383-396
 Haac, O. A. "Voltaire and Leibniz: two aspects of
 rationalism." Studies on Voltaire and the 18th Century,
 vol. 25, 1963: 795-809.
 Hacking, I. "The Leibniz-Carnap program for induc?
 tive logic." JP, vol. 68, 1971: 597-610.
 Hall, A. R. and Hall, M. B. "Clarke and Newton."
 Isis, vol. 52, 1961: 583-585.
 Heinekamp, A. Das Problem des Guten bei Leibniz. Bonn,
 Bouvier, 1969.
 Heintel, E. "Der Begriff der Erscheinung bei Leibniz."
 ZPF, vol. 20, 1966: 397-420.
 - "Die beiden Labyrinthe der Philosophie nach
 Leibniz." PN, vol. 10, 1967-68: 186-197.
 (15) Hintikka, J. "Leibniz on plenitude, relations and
 the 'reign of law'." Aj., vol. 21, 1969. Reprinted in
 Frankfurt (24).
 Holz, H. H. Herr und Knecht bei Leibniz und Hegel. Zur
 Interpretation der Klassengesellschaft. Neuwied,
 Luchterhand, 1968.
 Horn, J. C. Monade und Begriff, Der Weg von Leibniz zu
 Hegel. Wien-M?nchen, Oldenbourg, 1965.
 Howe, L. T. "Leibniz on evil." Sophia., vol. 10, 1971:
 8-17.
 Huberti, F. H. "Leibniziens Sprachverst?ndnis unter
 besonderer Ber?cksichtigung des III. Buches der
 ' Neuen Untersuchungen ?ber den Verstand'." WW,
 vol. 16, 1966: 36I-375
 Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hanover, 14, bis 19.
 November 1966. Akten. Band I: Metaphysik
 Monadenlehre. Wiesbaden, F. Steiner, 1968.
 Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hanover, 14. bis 19.
 November 1966. Akten. Band II: Mathematik,
 Naturwissenschaft. Wiesbaden, F. Steiner, 1969.
 Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Hanover, 14. bis 19.
 November 1966. Akten. Band III: Erkenntnislehre,
 Logik, Sprachphilosophie, Editionsberichte. Wies?
 baden, F. Steiner, 1969.
 (16) Ishiguro, H. "Leibniz's theory of the ideality of
 relations." In Frankfurt (24).
 (17)-Leibniz's philosophy of logic and language. Ithaca,
 Cornell University Press, 1972.
 Jalabert, J. Le Dieu de Leibniz. Paris, Presses universi?
 taires de France, i960: 224.
 - "Leibniz, philosophe de l'unit?." ?PF, vol. 20,
 1966:447-457.
 Janke, W. "Das ontologische Argument in der Fr?hzeit
 des Leibnizschen Denkens [1676-78]." K. St., vol.
 54, 1963: 259-288.
 -Leibniz, Die Emendation der Metaphysik. Frankfurt/
 M., Verlag V. Klostermann, 1963.
 Johnson, A. H. "Leibniz's method and the basis of his
 metaphysics." Philos., vol. 35, i960: 51-61.
 Kaulbach, F. Die Metaphysik des Raumes bei Leibniz und
 Kant. K?ln, K?lner Universit?tsverlag, i960.
 - "Le labyrinthe du continu." AP, vol. 29, 1966:
 507-535.
 Kauppi, R. " Substitutivity salva veri t?te in Leibniz and
 modern logic." Ratio, vol. 10, 1968: 141-149.
 (18) -?ber die Leibnizsche Logik: Mit besonderer
 Ber?cksichtigung des Probl?mes der Intension und
 der Extension. Helsinki, distributed by Akateeminen
 Kirjakauppa, i960.
 Koyre, A. and Cohen, I. B. "Case of the missing
 tanquam: Leibniz, Newton and Clarke." Isis, vol.
 52, 1961: 555-566
 - - "Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke corres?
 pondence with notes on Newton, Conti and Des
 Maizeaux." AIHS, vol. 15, 1962: 8-9, 63-126.
 Kr?ger, L. Rationalismus und Entwurf einer universalen
 Logik bei Leibniz. Frankfurt/M. Klostermann,
 1969
 Leibniz 1646-1716. Aspects de l'homme de l'oeuvre. Journ?es
 Leibniz organis?es au centre international de
 Synth?se, 28-30 mai 1966. Paris, Aubier-Montaigne,
 1968.
 Leibniz, G. W. Allgemeiner politischer und historischer
 Briefwechsel. Vol. VIII: 1692. Bearb. von G. Scheel
 u.a. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1970.
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 *-Confessio philosophi: ein Dialog. Kritische Ausgabe
 mit Einleitung, ?bersetzung, Kommentar von O.
 Saame. Frankfurt/M., V. Klostermann, 1967.
 - Confessio philosophi. La profession de foi du philo?
 sophe. Texte, traduction et notes par Y. Beiaval.
 Paris, J. Vrin, 1961.
 *- Fragmente zur Logik. Ausgew?hlt, ?bersetzt und
 erl?utert von Franz Schmidt. Berlin, Akademie
 Verlag, i960.
 -Kleine Schriften zur Metaphysik. Hrsg. und ?bersetzt
 von H. H. Holz. Frankfurt/M., Insel-Verlag, 1965.
 - Le Dialogue ir?nique Bossuet-Leibniz, la r?union
 des Eglises en ?chec (1691-1702) [r?dig? par] F.
 Gaqu?re. Paris, Beachesne, 1966.
 *-and Arnauld, A. The Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence.
 Edited and translated by H. T. Mason. Introduction
 by G. H. R. Parkinson. Manchester, Manchester
 University Press, 1967.
 *- Logical papers [selection] tr. with an introd. by
 G. H. R. Parkinson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.
 *-Monadology, and other philosophical essays. Translated
 by P. and A. M. Schrecker. Introd. by P. Schrecker.
 New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
 *- Philosophical papers and letters [selection]. Trans?
 lated with introd. by L. E. Loemker. 2nd rev. ed.
 Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969.
 *-Philosophische Schriften. Vol. 1: 1663-1672. Bearb.
 von W. Kabitz und H. Schepers. Berlin, Akademie
 Verlag, 1966.
 *-Politische Schriften. Vol. II: 1677-1687. Bearb. von
 Lotte Knabe u.a. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1963.
 *- Philosophische Schriften. Vol. VI: nouveaux essais.
 Bearb. von A. Robinet und H. Schepers. Berlin,
 Akademie-Verlag, 1962.
 -Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum ex ture collectarum.
 De casibus perplexis. Doctrina conditionum. De legum
 interpretatione. Introd. de T. Ascarelli, trad, par C.
 Ducouloux-Favard, pr?f. de A. Tune. Paris, Dalloz,
 1966.
 Lenders, W. "The Analytic Logic of G. W. Leibniz and
 C. Wolff." Syn., vol. 23, 1971: 147-153.
 Loemker, L. "Leibniz and the Herborn encyclopedists."
 JHI, vol. 22, 1961: 323-338.
 - "Leibniz in our time. A survey of recent Leibniz
 literature." PRdsch., vol. 13, 1965-66: 81-111.
 - "Leibniz's conception of philosophical method."
 ZPF, vol. 20, 1966: 507-525
 -"Leibniz und die Grenzen des Empirismus." KSt.,
 vol. 56, 1966: 315-328.
 -"Substance and process in Leibniz," in Process and
 Divinity, ed. W. R. Reese and Eugene Freeman, La
 Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1964.
 Lomasky, L. "Leibniz and the modal argument for
 God's existence." Mon., vol. 54, 1970: 250-269.
 MacIntosh, J. J. "Leibniz and Berkeley." PAS, vol. 71,
 1970-71: 147-163.
 McTighe, T. P. "Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz's prin?
 ciple of indiscernibility." MS, vol. 42, 1964: 33-46.
 Martin, G. Leibniz : Logic and metaphysics. Translated by
 P. G. Lucas and K. J. Northcott. Manchester,
 Manchester University Press, 1964.
 (19) Mates, B. "Leibniz on possible worlds." In Logic,
 Methodology and Philosophy of Science, HI, ed. by B. van
 Rootselaar and J. F. Staal, Amsterdam, North
 Holland Publishing Co., 1968: 507-529. Reprinted
 in Frankfurt (14).
 More au, J. Le Dieu des philosophes. Paris, J. Vrin, 1969.
 - "L'espace et les v?rit?s ?ternelles chez Leibniz."
 AP, vol. 29, 1966: 483-506.
 * M?ller, K., ed. Leibniz-Bibliographie. Die Literatur ?ber
 Leibniz. Frankfurt/M., V. Klostermann, 1967.
 -and Kr?nert, G. Leben und Werk von Gottfried Wil?
 helm Leibniz. Eine Chronik. Frankfurt/M., V.
 Klostermann, XXIV, 1969.
 Naert, E. La pens?e politique de Leibniz. Paris, Presses
 Universitaires de France, 1964.
 -M?moire et conscience de soi selon Leibniz. Paris, J. Vrin,
 1961.
 O'Briant, W. H. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's General In?
 vestigations concerning the analysis of concepts and truths.
 Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1968.
 - "Leibniz's preference for an intensional logic."
 NDJFL, vol. 8, 1967: 254-256.
 Odegard, D. "Essences and discovery: Plato, Locke
 and Leibniz." Dialogue, vol. 3, 1964: 219-234.
 (20) Parkinson, G. H. R. Logic and reality in Leibniz's
 metaphysics. London, Oxford University Press, 1965.
 Perl, M. R. "Physics and metaphysics in Newton,
 Leibniz and Clarke." JHI, vol. 30, 1969: 507-526.
 Peursen, C. A. van. Leibniz. Translated by H. Hoskins.
 London, Faber and Faber, 1969.
 Philonenko, A. "La loi de continuit? et le principe des
 indiscernables, ?tude leibnizienne." RM M, vol. 72,
 1967: 261-286.
 Poser, H. "Zum logischen und inhaltlichen Zusammen?
 hang der Modal-begriffe bei Leibniz." KSt., vol. 60,
 1969:436-451.
 - Zur Theorie der Modalbegriffe bei G. W. Leibniz.
 Steiner-Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1969.
 Priestley, F. E. L. "The Clarke-Leibniz Controversy."
 In The Methodological Heritage of Newton, ed. by R. E.
 Butts and J. W. Davis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1970:
 34-56.
 Prior, A. N. "Time, existence and identity." In his
 Papers on time and tense. Oxford, Clarendon Press,
 1968: 78-87.
 Rescher, N. "Identity, substitution and modality."
 RM, vol. 14, i960: 158-167.
 - "Logical difficulties in Leibniz' metaphysics." In
 his Essays in philosophical analysis. Pittsburgh, Uni?
 versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1969: 159-170.
 (21) - The philosophy of Leibniz. Englewood Cliffs,
 N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1967.
 Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 20, no. 76-77, 1966.
 Devoted to Leibniz. Articles by Robinet, Kneale,
 Costabel, Capek, et al.
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 Robinet, A. Leibniz. Paris, Seghers, 1962.
 Ross, J. F. "Logically necessary existential statements."
 JP, vol. 58, 1961: 253-263.
 Russell, L. J. "What is living and what is dead in the
 philosophy of Leibniz." Filosof?a, vol. 19, 1968:
 699-712.
 Sainati, V. "Sulla l?gica leibniziana." Filosofa, vol. 21,
 1970: 221-258.
 Savile, A. "Leibniz's contribution to the theory of
 innate ideas." Philos., vol. 47, 1972: 113-124.
 Schepers, H. "M?glichkeit und Kontingenz (zur
 Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie von
 Leibniz)." Filosofa, vol. 14, 1963: 901-914.
 - "Zum Problem der Kontigenz bei Leibniz; Die
 beste der m?glichen Welten." In Collegium philo
 sophicum: Studien Joachim Ritter zum 60. Geburstag.
 Basel, Schwabe, 1965: 326-350.
 Schmidt, F. " Die Entwicklung der Leibnizischen Logik."
 KSt., vol. 52, 1960-61: 43-58.
 Schneider, H-P. Justina universalis: Quellenstudien zur
 Geschichte des "christlichen Naturrechts" bei Gottfried Wil?
 helm Leibniz. Frankfurt/M., V. Klostermann, 1967.
 Sellars, W. "M?ditations leibniziennes." APQ, vol. 2,
 1965: 105-118.
 Serres, M. Le syst?me de Leibniz et ses mod?les math?matiques.
 Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1968: 2 vol.
 Simonovits, A. Dialektisches Denken in der Philosophie von
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag,
 1968.
 Strauss, M. "Die Huygens-Leibniz-Machsche Kritik in
 Lichte heutiger Erkenntnis." D?P, vol. 16, 1968:
 117-120.
 ToTOK, W. and Haase, C. (ed.). Leibniz: sein Leben, sein
 Wirken, seine Welt. Hanover, Verlag f?r Literatur und
 Zeitgeschichte, 1966.
 Tymieniecka, A. T. Leibniz' cosmological synthesis. Assen,
 Van Gorcum, 1964.
 - "Leibniz' metaphysics and his theory of the uni?
 versal science." IPQ,, vol. 3, 1963: 370-391.
 Wiedeburg, P. Der junge Leibniz, das Reich und Europa.
 Teil I. Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1962.
 Wilson, M. "Leibniz and Locke on first truths." JHI,
 vol. 28, 1967: 347-366.
 -"Possibility, propensity and chance: some doubts
 about the Hacking thesis." JP, vol. 68, 1971: 610
 617.
 MALEBRANCHE
 (22) Bastide. G., ed. Malebranche, l'homme et l'oeuvre
 (1638-1715). Paris, J. Vrin, 1967.
 Bracken, H. "Berkeley and Malebranche on ideas."
 MS, vol. 41, 1963: 1-15.
 (23) Connell, D. The vision in God. Malebranche's
 scholastic sources. Paris, B?atrice-Neuwelaerts, 1967.
 Hankins, T. L. "Influence of Malebranche on the
 science of mechanics during the eighteenth century."
 JHI, vol. 28, 1967: 193-210.
 Lattre, A. de. "Le ferveur malebranchiste et l'ordre
 des raisons." RPFE, vol. 86, 1961: 73-86; vol. 87,
 1962: 359-364; vol. 89, 1964: 90-102.
 -"La volont? chez Malebranche et les contradictions
 de la doctrine." RPFE, vol. 89, 1964: 103-109.
 *(24) Malebranche, N. Oeuvres compl?tes. 20 vols. ed.
 par A. Robinet, G. Lewis-Rodis, et al. Paris, J. Vrin,
 1960-66.
 Merleau-Ponty, M. V Union de l'?me et du corps chez
 Malebranche, Maine de Biran et Bergson. Notes prises
 au cours de M. Merleau-Ponty ? l'Ecole Normale
 Sup?rieure (1947-1948) recueillies et r?dig?es par
 Jean Deprun, Paris, J. Vrin, 1968.
 Moreau, J. "Saint Augustin et Malebranche." In La
 Philosophie et ses probl?mes. Recueil d'?tudes offert ? Mon?
 seigneur R. J olivet. Lyons-Paris, E. Vitte, i960: 109
 136.
 (25) Nicolosi, S. Causalit? divina e liberta umana nel
 pensiero di Malebranche. Padova, Cedam, 1963.
 Robinet, A. "Conception tragique et conception op?
 timiste de la nature humaine dans la philosophie de
 Malebranche." EP, vol. 16, 3, 1961: 317-321.
 (26) - Malebranche de VAcad?mie des Sciences. Paris,
 Librairie philosophique, J. Vrin, 1970: 447.
 (27) -Syst?me et existence dans Voeuvre de Malebranche.
 Paris, J. Vrin, 1965.
 (28) Rodis-Lewis, G. Nicholas Malebranche. Paris, Presses
 Universitaires de France, 1963.
 (29) Rome, B. The philosophy of Malebranche : a study of his
 integration of faith, reason, and experimental observation.
 Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1963.
 Walton, C. " Malebranch's ontology." JHP, vol. 7,
 1969: 143-161.
 (30) -De la recherche du bien, a study of Malebranche's
 science of ethics. The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1972.
 MERSENNE
 *Mersenne, M. Correspondance du P. Marin Mer senne. Vol.
 Ill, 2e ed., Vol. VI-IX ed. C. de Waard. Paris,
 Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
 1961-69.
 -Harmonie universelle: the books on instruments. Trans?
 lated by R. Chapman. New York, W. S. Heinman,
 1965
 *-Les M?caniques de Galil?e math?maticien et ing?nieur
 du duc de Florence. Traduites de l'italien par le P.
 Marin Mersenne, Edition critique par B. Rochot,
 Paris. Presses universitaires de France, 1966.
 Rochot, B. "Le P. Mersenne et les relations intellec?
 tuelles dan l'Europe du XVII si?cle." CHM, vol. 10,
 1966-67: 55-73.
 PASCAL
 Belaval, Y. "Pascal savant." RTL, vol. 13, 1963: 1-11.
 Birault, H. "Nietzsche et le pari de Pascal." AF, No. 3,
 1962: 67-90.
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 Bishop, M. G. Pascal : the life of genius. New York, Green?
 wood Press, 1968.
 Broome, J. H. Pascal. London, Edward Arnold, 1965.
 Cailliet, E. Pascal. The emergence of genius. Introduction
 by C. S. Duthie. 2nd ed. with appendix on recent
 research. New York, Harper, 1961.
 Cargile, J. "Pascal's wager." Philos., vol. 41, 1966:
 250-257.
 Castelli, E., ed. Pascal e Nietzsche. Padova, Cedam, 1962.
 Chaigne, L. Pascal. Paris, Wesmael-Charlier, 1962.
 Ernst, P. Approches pascaliennes. Pref. de J. Mesnard.
 Gembloux (Belg.), Duculot, 1970.
 Friedenthal, R. Entdecker des Ich: Montaigne, Pascal,
 Diderot. M?nchen, R. Piper & Co., 1969.
 -" De betekenis van Pascals mathematische filosofie."
 ANTW, vol. 54, 1962: 182-193.
 Garrone, C. G.-M. Ce que croyait Pascal. Paris, Mame,
 1969.
 GivoNE, S. "Il problema della fede in Pascal e in
 James." Filosofa, vol. 20, 1969: 261-288.
 Goldmann, L. The hidden God. A study of tragic vision in the
 Pens?es of Pascal and the tragedies of Racine. Trans?
 lated by Philip Thody. London, Routledge and
 Kegan Paul, 1963.
 Gouhier, H. Blaise Pascal, Commentaires. Paris, J. Vrin,
 1966.
 Guitton, J. G?nie de Pascal. Paris, Aubier, 1962.
 Hacking, I. "The logic of Pascal's wager." APQ, vol. 9,
 1972: 186-192.
 Hazelton, R. "Pascal's wager argument." In The
 heritage of Christian thought. Essays in honor of Robert
 Lowry Calhoun. Edited by R. E. Cushman and E.
 Grislis. New York, Harper, 1965: 108-126.
 Itard, J. "L'introduction ? la g?om?trie de Pascal."
 RHSA, vol. 15, 1962: 269-286.
 James, E. D. "The theorem of sufficient grace and the
 Lettres provinciales." FS, vol. 21, 1967: 205-219.
 Klein, Z. La notion de dignit? humaine dans la pens?e de Kant
 et de Pascal. Paris, J. Vrin, 1968.
 Larraillet, P. Pascal et le probl?me de la destin?e. Paris,
 Nouvelles ?ditions latines, 1970.
 Martino, V. B. Pascal nella unit? del suo pensiero. Lecce,
 Edizione Milella, 1962.
 Meil, J. Pascal and theology. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
 Press, 1970.
 Mesnard, J. Pascal et les Roannez. I?II. Bruges-Paris,
 Descl?e de Brouwer, 1965.
 Pareyson, L. H?tica di Pascal. Torino, G. Giappichelli,
 1966.
 Penelhum, T. "Pascal's wager." JR, vol. 44, 1964: 201
 209.
 Plamenatz, J. "Pascal and Rousseau." Pol. St., vol. 10,
 1962: 248-263.
 Sadoun-Goupil, M. "L'oeuvre de Pascal et la physique
 moderne." RHSA, vol. 16, 1963: 23-52.
 Sellier, P. Pascal et saint Augustin. Paris, Colin, 1970: 656.
 Sina, M. L'"Anti-Pascal" di Voltaire. Milano, Vita e
 Pensiero, 1970: 261.
 Steinmann, J. Pascal. Translated by M. Turnell, New
 York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966: 304.
 Turner, M. B. "Deciding for God. The Bayesian sup?
 port of Pascal's wager." PPR, vol. 29, 1968: 84-90.
 PUFENDORF
 Krieger, L. The politics of discretion : Pufendorf and the
 acceptance of natural law. Chicago, University of
 Chicago Press, 1965.
 SPINOZA
 Beck, L. W. "Spinoza." In his Six secular philosophers.
 New York, Harper and Row, i960: 27-41.
 Belaief, G. Spinoza's philosophy of law. The Hague,
 Mouton, 1971.
 Bollacher, M. Der junge Goethe und Spinoza. M. Nie?
 meyer Verlag, T?bingen, 1969.
 Christian, W. A. "Spinoza on theology and truth." In
 The heritage of Christian thought. Essays in honor of
 Robert Lowry Calhoun. Edited by R. E. Cushman
 and E. Grislis. New York, Harper, 1965: 89-107.
 (31) Curley, E. M. Spinoza's metaphysics: an essay in
 interpretation. Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
 1969.
 de Deugd, C. "Old wine in new bottles? Tillich and
 Spinoza." In Royal Institute of Philosophy. Talk of God.
 New York, St. Martins, 1969: 133-151.
 - The significance of Spinoza's first kind of knowledge.
 Assen van Gorcum, 1966.
 Deleuze, G. Spinoza. Paris, Presses universitaires de
 France, 1970.
 -Spinoza et le probl?me de l'expression. Paris, Editions de
 Minuit, 1968.
 De Lucca, J. "Wolfson on Spinoza's use of the more
 geom?trico." Dial., vol. 6, 1967: 89-102.
 Eisenberg, P. "How to understand De Intellectus
 Emendatione." JHP, vol. 9, 1971: 171-191.
 Feuer, L. S. Spinoza and the rise of liberalism. London, May?
 flower, i960.
 Frank, D. F. Spinoza. Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 1964.
 (32) Freeman, E. and Mandelbaum, M. Spinoza: Essays
 in Interpretation. La Salle, 111., Open Court, 1973.
 Calvetti, C. Spinoza, I presupposti teoretici dell' irenismo
 etico. Milano, Ed. Vita e Pensiero, 1968.
 *Giancotti-Boscherini, E. Lexicon Spinozanum. 2 vol.
 The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
 Gram, M. S. "Spinoza, substance and predication."
 Theoria., vol. 34, 1968: 222-244.
 Grene, M., ed., Spinoza, a collection of critical essays. Gar?
 den City, N.Y., Anchor, 1973.
 (33) Gueroult, M. Spinoza, Vol. I: Dieu (Ethique, I).
 Paris, Editions Montaigne, 1968.
 Hallett, H. F. Creation, emanation and salvation: a
 Spinozistic study. The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1962.
 Hampshire, S. "Spinoza and the idea of freedom." PBA,
 vol. 46, i960: 195-215.
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 Hubbeling, H. S. Spinoza. Baarn, Het Wereldvenster,
 1966.
 -Spinoza's methodology. Assen, Van Gorcum, 1964.
 Inquiry, vol. 12, No. 1, 1969. Devoted to Spinoza, with
 articles by Saw, Parkinson, Naess, McShea, et al.
 Lacharri?re, R. Etudes sur la th?orie d?mocratique,
 Spinoza, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx. Paris, Payot, 1963.
 Lacroix, J. Spinoza et le probl?me du salut. Paris, Presses
 universitaires de France, 1970.
 Les ?tudes philosophiques, n. 3, juillet-septembre, 1972.
 Devoted to Spinoza, with articles by Caillois,
 Matheron, Moreau, Zac, et al.
 McShea, R. J. The political philosophy of Spinoza. New
 York, Columbia University Press, 1968.
 Malet, A. Le trait? th?ologico-politique de Spinoza et la
 pens?e biblique. Paris, Soci?t? d'Editions Les Belles
 Lettres, 1966.
 Mark, T. C. Spinoza's theory of truth. New York, Columbia
 University Press, 1972.
 Matheron, A. Individu et communaut? chez Spinoza. Paris,
 Les editions de Minuit, 1969.
 Millet, L. Pour conna?tre la pens?e de Spinoza. Paris, Bordas,
 1971.
 Misrahi, R. Spinoza. Paris, Seghers, 1964.
 Naulin, P. "La connaissance du bien et du mal selon
 Spinoza." EP, No. 3, 1969: 359~37i; No. 1, 1970:
 13-24.
 *Oko, A. S., comp. Spinoza bibliography. Boston, Hall
 1964.
 Pines, S. "Spinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus, Maimo
 nides and Kant." In Further studies in philosophy.
 Edited by O. Segal, Jerusalem, Magnes Press, 1968:
 3-54
 Pr?posiet, J. Spinoza et la libert? des hommes. Paris, Galli?
 mard, 1967.
 Reale Diliberto, M. A. "L'errore come fatto teor?tico
 nella filosof?a di Spinoza." Filosofa, vol. 18, April
 1967: 265-294.
 R?vah, I. S. "Aux origines de la rupture spinozienne."
 REJ, vol. 123 (s. 4, v. 3), 1964: 359-431
 -Spinoza et Juan de Prado. Paris, La Haye, Mouton &
 Co., 1959.
 R?d, W. "Spinozas Lehre von der Societas." Filosof?a,
 vol. 18, 1967: 777-806; vol. 19, 1968: 671-698.
 -"Van den Hoves Politische Waage und die Modifi?
 kation der Hobbesschen Staatsphilosophie bei
 Spinoza." JHP, vol. 8, 1970: 29-48.
 Rousset, B. La perspective finale de "l'Ethique" et le prob?
 l?me de la coh?rence du spinozisme. L'autonomie comme
 salut. Paris, J. Vrin, 1968.
 Spinoza, B. Abr?g? de grammaire h?bra?que [Compendium
 grammatices linguae h?braeae] Introd. trad, fran?
 ?aise et notes par J. Askinazi et J. Askinazi-Gerson.
 Paris, J. Vrin, 1968.
 *-Algebraic calculation of the rainbow, 1687. [Facsimile
 of the original Dutch text]. Introd. by G. ten
 Doesschate. Nieuwkoop, B. de Graaf, 1963.
 Steffen, H. Recht und Staat in System Spinozas. Bonn,
 Bouvier, 1968.
 Strauss, L. Spinoza's critique of religion. Translated by E.
 M. Sinclair. New York, Schocken Books, 1965.
 Teo, K. H. "The relation of substance to attributes in
 Spinoza." Kin., vol. 1, 1968: 15-21.
 Texte zur Geschichte des Spinozismus. Hrsg. von Norbert
 Altwicker, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Dann?
 stadt, 1971.
 van der Tak, W. G. B. de Spinoza. 's-Gravenhage,
 Kruseman, 1961.
 Watt, A. J. "The causality of God in Spinoza's philo?
 sophy." CJP, vol. 2, 1972: 171-189; reply by E.
 Harris, ibid. : 191-197.
 Wetlesen, J. A Spinoza bibliography. Particularly on the
 period 1940-1967. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1968.
 2nd rev. ed., 1971.
 Zac, S. L'id?e de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza. Paris,
 Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.
 -Le Morale de Spinoza. 2e ?dit. revue et augment?e.
 Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.
 -Spinoza et l'interpr?tation de l'Ecriture. Paris, Presses
 universitaires de France, 1965.
 MISCELLANEOUS
 Allen, D. Doubt's boundless sea: scepticism and faith in the
 Renaissance. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1964.
 Ashworth, E. J. "The doctrine of supposition in the
 sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." AGP, vol.
 51, 1969: 260-285.
 - "Some notes on syllogistic in the sixteenth and
 seventeenth centuries." NDJFL, vol. 11, 1970: 17
 33
 Bartley, W. W. "Approaches to science and scepti?
 cism." PF, vol. 1, 1969: 318-329.
 Beaufret, J. Evidence et v?rit? (Descartes et Leibniz).
 Paris, Vezin, 1964.
 Belaval, Y. Leibniz critique de Descartes. Paris, Gallimard,
 i960.
 Birault, H. "Science et m?taphysique chez Descartes
 et chez Pascal." AP, vol. 27, 1964: 483-526.
 Block, O.-R. "Gassendi critique de Descartes." RPFE,
 vol. 156, 1966: 217-236.
 Blondel, M. Dialogues avec les philosophes, Descartes
 Spinoza-Malebranche-Pascal-Saint Augustin. Pr?face
 par H. Gouhier, Paris, Aubier, 1966.
 Boas, G. The happy beast in French thought of the seventeenth
 century. New York, Octagon, 1966.
 Brehier, E. Etudes de philosophie moderne. Paris, Presses
 universitaires de France, 1965.
 Buchdahl, G. Metaphysics and the philosophy of science, the
 classical origins: Descartes to Kant. Cambridge, Mass.
 M.I.T. Press, 1969.
 Clark, J. T. "Pierre Gassendi and the physics of
 Galileo." Isis, vol. 54, 1963: 352-370.
 Cohen, I. B. The birth of a new physics. New York, Double
 day, i960.
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 - "'Quantum in se est': Newton, Kepler, Galileo,
 Descartes and Lucretius." PACPA, vol. 38, 1964:
 36-46.
 Cummins, P. "Perceptual relativity and ideas in the
 mind." PPR, vol. 24, 1963: 202-214.
 CoRSANO, A. "Campanella e Galileo." GCFI, vol. 44,
 1965: 313-332.
 De ?Angelis, E. II m?todo geom?trico nella filosofa del
 Seicento. Pisa, Instituto di filosof?a, 1964.
 - "Il m?todo geom?trico da Cartesio a Spinoza."
 GCFI, vol. 43, 1964: 394-427.
 de Lubac, H. Augustinisme et th?ologie moderne. Paris,
 Aubier, 1965. Eng. tr. Augustinianism and modem
 theology by L. Sheppard, London, Geoffrey Chap?
 man, 1969.
 de Vleeschauwer, H. J. More seu or dine geom?trico
 demonstratum. Communications of the University of
 South ?Africa, Pretoria, 1961. (Study of Descartes,
 Geulincx and Spinoza).
 Fleckenstein, J. O. Naturwissenschaft und Politik; Von
 Galilei bis Einstein. M?nchen, Verlag Goerg D. W.
 Callwey, 1965.
 GooDHUE, W. W. "Pascal's theory of knowledge: a re?
 action to the analytical method of Descartes." MS,
 vol. 47, 1969: 15-35.
 GouHiER, H. "Les philosophes du XVIIe si?cle devant
 l'histoire de la philosophie." Bulletin de la Soci?t?
 d'Etudes du XVIIe Si?cle, No. 54-55, 1962: 5-16.
 Gueroult, M. Etudes sur Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche
 et Leibniz. Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1970.
 Heimsoeth, H. Atom, Seele, Monade, Historische Urspr?nge
 und Hintergr?nde von Kants Antinomie der Teilung.
 Mainz, Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften
 und der Literatur, Wiesbaden, i960.
 Horowitz, M. C. "Pierre Charron's view of the source
 of wisdom." JHP, vol. 9, 1971: 443~457
 Jaynes, J. "Animate motion in the seventeenth cen?
 tury." JHI, vol. 31, 1970: 219-234.
 KiRKiNEN, H. Les origines de la conception moderne le
 l'homme-machine; Le probl?me de l'?me en France ? la fin
 du r?gne de Loui XIV (1670-1715). Helsinki, Academia
 Scientiarum Fennica, i960.
 Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. The development of logic.
 Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962.
 Knight, D. M. "Uniformity and diversity of nature in
 17th century treatises of plurality of worlds."
 Organon, No. 4, 1967: 61-68.
 Koyre, A. Metaphysics & measurement: essays in scientific
 revolution. London, Chapman & Hall, 1968.
 Krailsheimer, A. J. Studies in self-interest: from Descartes
 to La Bruy?re. New York, Oxford University Press,
 1962.
 Kristeller, P. O. " The myth of Renaissance atheism and
 the French tradition of free thought." JHP, vol. 6,
 1968: 233-243.
 Leyden, W. von. Seventeenth-century metaphysics: an
 examination of some main concepts and theories. London,
 G. Duckworth, 1968.
 L?with, K. Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von
 Descartes bis zu Nietzsche. G?ttingen, Vandenhoeck
 und Ruprecht, 1967.
 McRae, R. "'Idea' as a philosophical term in the
 seventeenth century." JHI, vol. 26, 1965: 175
 190.
 - The problem of the unity of the sciences : Bacon to Kant.
 Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1961.
 M?langes Alexandre Koyr?: publi?s ? l'occasion de son soixante
 dixi?me anniversaire. 2 vol. Paris, Hermann, 1964.
 Miel, J. Pascal; "Port-Royal and Cartesian linguistics."
 JHI, vol. 30, 1969: 261-271.
 N?dor, G. "Scientia mirabilis. Descartes et Leibniz."
 Dial, vol. 19, 1965: 144-157.
 Norton, D. "Leibniz and Bayle: manicheism and
 dialectic." JHP, vol. 2, 1964: 23-36.
 (34) Popkin, R. H. The history of scepticism from Erasmus to
 Descartes. Assen, Van Gorcum, i960; 2nd edition,
 revised. New York, Humanities Press, 1964.
 -"Scepticism, Theology and the Scientific Revolu?
 tion in the 17th Century." In Problems in the philosophy
 of science, ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Amster?
 dam, North Holland, 1968; comments by Williams
 and Momigliano.
 - "The high road to pyrrhonism." APQ, vol. 2,
 1965: 18-32.
 (35) Rescher, N. "The concept of non-existent possibles."
 In his Essays in philosophical analysis. Pittsburgh,
 University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969: 73-109.
 Risse, W. Die Logik der Neuzeit 2 Bd: 1640-1780. Stuttgart
 Bad Connstatt, Friedrich Fromman Verlag, 1970.
 Robinet, A. "Cart?sianisme et leibnizianisme." RS, vol.
 82, 1961: 73-89.
 Rodis-Lewis, G. Descartes et le rationalisme. Paris, Presses
 Universitaires de France, 1966.
 Sabra, A. I. Theories of light from Descartes to Newton.
 London, Oldbourne, 1967.
 Sebba, G. "What is ' History of Philosophy ' ? " JHP, vol.
 8, 1970: 251-262.
 Spink, J. S. French free-thought from Gassendi to Voltaire.
 London, Athelone, i960.
 Stankiewicz, W. J. Politics and religion in seventeenth
 century France. A study of political ideas from the
 Monarchomachs to Bayle, as reflected in the
 toleration controversy. Berkeley, University of
 California Press, i960.
 Taliaferro, R. The concept of matter in Descartes and
 Leibniz. Notre Dame Ind., University of Notre
 Dame, 1964.
 Vesey, G. N. A., ed. Reason and Reality. Royal Institute
 of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 5. London, Macmillan,
 1972. Articles by Brodbeck (on Descartes), Geach
 and Macintosh (on Spinoza) and Ishiguro (on
 Leibniz).
 Villey, M. "Les fondateurs de l'?cole de droit naturel
 moderne au XVIIe si?cle." APD, No. 6, 1961: 73
 105.
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 Vuillemin, J. "Sur la diff?rence et l'identit? des
 m?thodes de la m?taphysique et des math?matiques
 chez Descartes et Leibniz et sur la conception
 classique des principes de causalit? et de corres?
 pondance." AGP, vol. 43, 1961: 267-302.
 Walker, D. P. The decline of hell: seventeenth-century dis?
 cussions of eternal torment. London, Routledge and
 Kegan Paul, 1964.
 Watson, R. "The breakdown of Cartesian meta?
 physics." JHP, vol. i, 1963: 177-197.
 - The downfall of Cartesianism : 1673-1712. The Hague,
 M. Nijhoff, 1966.
 Whiteside, D. T. "Patterns of mathematical thought in
 the later seventeenth century." Arch. Hist. ex. Sei.,
 vol. 1, 1961: I79-388
 Yates, F. A. Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic tradition.
 London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964.
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